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Improving Hedge Fund
Governance
This article provides a comprehensive analysis of the internal governance of hedge funds. The primary components of hedge
fund governance are investors with a high propensity to exercise their short-term redemption rights; managers with high payperformance sensitivity, because they are being compensated with an annual performance-based fee plus earnings from their
own investment in the funds they manage; sophisticated investors who demand quality governance; and short-term creditors
and derivatives counterparties who provide close monitoring. Hedge fund governance needs the most improvement in the
areas of performance reporting (valuation) and the timing of performance-fee calculations. Further, counterintuitively, in
some circumstances investors may benefit from less disclosure, higher fees, and less access to their capital.
HOUMAN B. SHADAB

T

he hedge fund industry is currently at a crossroads where several fundamental trends meet.
Capital is flowing into the industry from institutional investors like never before. In the first half
of 2014, $56.9 billion was allocated to hedge funds
globally, causing the industry to near $3 trillion in assets for the first time.1 At the same time, hedge fund
performance in absolute terms has trailed the stock
market for five consecutive years, causing investors to
raise concerns about fees and other aspects of their
investments. In addition, there are now a number
of alternatives to hedge funds that are cheaper and
have more investor-friendly characteristics, and that
are competing for institutional investors. These alternatives include regulated mutual funds that employ
hedge fund-like investment strategies.2

1
“Hedge Fund Capital Surges to New Milestone on Strong 2Q
Inflows” (Press Release, Hedge Fund Research, July 18, 2014), available at https://www.hedgefundresearch.com/pdf/pr_20140718.pdf.
2
“Deutsche Bank Study Shows Investor Demand Fuelling Dramatic
Growth of Hedge Fund Liquid Alternatives” (MarketWatch, Sept. 8,
2014), available at http://www.marketwatch.com/story/deutsche-bankstudy-shows-investor-demand-fuelling-dramatic-growth-of-hedgefund-liquid-alternatives-2014-09-08?reflink=MW_news_stmp.
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Underlying these trends is the growing importance
to investors of the internal governance of hedge funds.
Since the financial crisis of 2008, concerns about
hedge fund governance have centered on transparency,
operational practices, and the growing view that fund
directors do not effectively monitor fund managers.
The June 2012 enforcement action by the United
States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
against the prominent hedge fund manager Phillip
Falcone exemplifies these governance concerns. The
SEC alleged that Falcone misappropriated investor assets and granted favorable treatment to some investors
without the knowledge of the fund’s directors or other
investors.3 As a result of such developments, major
institutions are increasingly refusing to invest in hedge
funds that fail to meet their governance standards.
There is reason to focus on these governance issues.
Hedge fund governance matters to investors because
better governance can lead to higher returns. Governance matters to managers because better governance
can help managers raise and retain capital. The growing focus on governance, combined with the increasing number of hedge funds competing for capital, has
resulted in greater bargaining power for investors
concerning fees and other governance devices.
This article provides a comprehensive analysis of
the internal governance of hedge funds. Hedge fund
governance is a form of managerialism because the
3
SEC, “Philip A. Falcone and Harbinger Charged With Securities Fraud” (Press Release, June 27, 2012), available at http://www.
sec.gov/news/press/2012/2012-122.htm.
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funds’ underlying legal regime gives managers near
complete authority over the structure and operations
of the funds they manage. At the same time, hedge
fund governance is also uniquely responsive in the
sense that, to obtain and retain investor capital, hedge
fund managers must be highly responsive to the preferences of equity investors (the limited partners). This
responsiveness arises from a fundamental dynamic of
hedge fund governance—the propensity of investors
to “pull the plug” and cash out of a fund if they are
dissatisfied. Although hedge fund investors usually
face short-term redemption restrictions, they typically can disrupt the operations of a fund, or even

lthough investors generally benefit from low
fees and significant transparency and
liquidity, if investor-friendly governance devices
are improperly structured or taken too far,
investors run the risk of undermining the unique
performance-based incentives and other
governance mechanisms that enable hedge funds
to produce superior returns in the first place.

A

cause it to wind down in a few months to a year, by
withdrawing their capital.
The primary components of hedge fund governance
consist of:
• Investors with a high propensity to exercise their
short-term redemption rights;
• Managers with high pay-performance sensitivity, because they are compensated with an annual
performance-based fee plus gains on their own
investment in the funds they manage;
• Sophisticated investors who demand quality governance; and
• Short-term creditors and derivatives counterparties
who provide close monitoring.
The hedge fund governance regime is also notable
for what it lacks. Not only do hedge funds lack permanent or long-term capital but hedge fund managers
are not subject to stringent board oversight, removal
by investors, or any market for corporate control.
Unlike private equity and venture capital funds, hedge
funds are not organized as “closed-end” funds for
a finite (e.g., 10-year) duration and, hence, are not
subject to the discipline of being required to return
capital to investors at the end of a specified investment lifecycle.
This is not to say that hedge fund managers are
systematically ripping off investors. Empirical stud-

28

ies do not find pervasive or significant fraud or other
types of agency costs. In addition, empirical studies
strongly suggest that hedge funds outperform stock
and bond markets on a risk-adjusted basis even after
managers are paid their fees. For example, a study
of hedge fund performance from January 1994 to
September 2008 found that most hedge fund investment strategies returned alpha and that alpha did not
decrease on an industry-wide level over that time.4
Another study of hedge fund returns, which included
data regarding over 20,000 funds from January 1994
to December 2010, found significant hedge fund alpha of 5.2 percent annually (using the study’s most
conservative estimate).5 In addition to outperforming
the stock market on a stand-alone basis, numerous
studies find that hedge funds can help to diversify,
and hence improve the performance of, a traditional
investment portfolio of stocks and bonds.6
Nonetheless, there is still plenty of room for
improvement in hedge fund governance. The areas
needing the most improvement are (1) performance reporting (valuation) and (2) the timing of performancefee calculations. Investors should be careful of what
they wish for, however, when choosing or negotiating
governance structures. Although investors generally
benefit from low fees and significant transparency
and liquidity, if investor-friendly governance devices
are improperly structured or taken too far, investors
run the risk of undermining the unique performancebased incentives and other governance mechanisms
that enable hedge funds to produce superior returns
in the first place. Counterintuitively, investors may
benefit from less disclosure, higher fees, and less access to their capital.

BASIC LEGAL FRAMEWORK
A “hedge fund” consists of three basic entities:
1. The fund itself;
2. The fund’s management company; and
3. The fund’s equity investors.

4

Manuel Ammann, Otto R. Huber & Markus M. Schmid, “Has
Hedge Fund Alpha Disappeared?” (Unpublished manuscript, Sept.
24, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1532742.
5

Juha Joenväärä, Robert Kosowski & Pekka Tolonen, “New
‘Stylized Facts’ About Hedge Funds and Database Selection Bias”
3 (Unpublished manuscript, Oct. 25, 2013), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1989410.
6
See, e.g., Wolfgang Bessler, Julian Holler & Philipp Kurmann,
“Hedge Funds and Optimal Asset Allocation: Bayesian Expectations and Spanning Tests,” 26 Fin. Mkts. Portfolio Mgmt. 109,
136-138 (2012).
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Organizing the fund as either a U.S. limited partnership or an offshore corporation affords the hedge
fund manager overwhelming flexibility in managing
its operational practices and carrying out its investment strategy. The general partner of a hedge fund
limited partnership is responsible for managing all aspects of the fund’s business, including its investment
portfolio.
Hedge Fund Limited Partnerships. A hedge fund limited
partnership’s general partner serves as the fund’s
portfolio manager and investment adviser. Because the
general partner bears unlimited liability for any debts
the partnership itself cannot satisfy,7 it is organized as
a limited liability entity to prevent the manager from
being subject to personal liability. The fund’s general
partner (management company) is governed by its
operating agreement which determines issues such as
how the manager’s profits and losses are allocated and
the terms of withdrawal.
Fiduciary Duties. Fiduciary duties imposed on
the management company stem from two sources.
First, as investment advisers, federal law imposes fiduciary duties on hedge fund management companies of loyalty and care to the funds they advise.8
These duties include providing independent investment advice that is suitable for the fund; putting the
fund’s interests above the adviser’s own; and disclosing any potential conflicts of interest between the adviser and the fund, including the general nature of
any preferential treatment to some investors. Second,
state-level limited partnership law typically imposes
default fiduciary duties upon managers.9 Although fiduciary duties are generally viewed as contractual in
nature and may be eliminated entirely in the fund’s
operating agreement, in practice, hedge funds typically do not entirely eliminate the fiduciary duties the
management company (general partner) owes to the
limited partners.

7

See Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 17-403 (West 2012).

Management Compensation. Under the terms of
the manager’s agreement with the fund it advises, the
management company is compensated in part by a
management fee. The management fee ranges from 1 to
2 percent of the fund’s net asset value and is calculated
monthly or quarterly. The manager is also compensated with a performance fee averaging approximately
18 percent of the annual profits of the fund.10
A defining feature of hedge funds is that their
management companies are also compensated based
upon the performance of the funds they advise. Fund
performance typically is calculated on an annual basis.
Hedge fund performance-based fee rates average 18
percent of profits in excess of prior losses and net of
management fees.11
Contractual provisions requiring the fund to exceed
a threshold level of returns before any compensation

defining feature of hedge funds is that
their management companies are also
compensated based upon the performance of
the funds they advise.

A

is allocated to the manager typically limit managers’
performance-based compensation. One such provision is a high-water mark, which limits the performance allocation to positive gains above the amount
of the investor’s capital contribution. A high-water
mark requires any losses from previous years to be
recouped first, meaning that an investor must actually
receive a net positive return on its investment before a
manager is paid a performance fee. High-water marks
are utilized by most hedge funds. When hedge funds
use high-water marks, they typically charge investors a performance fee five times higher than those
funds that do not (i.e., 15.3 percent versus about 3
percent), likely in exchange for investors not having
to pay a performance fee until the fund produces a
profit for them.12 Because investors may invest at different times, a process known as share equalization
must be undertaken to ensure that performance fees

8

SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180,
194 (1963); SEC, Study on Investment Advisers and BrokerDealers (Jan. 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
studies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf; see especially discussion at p.
22. Only under limited circumstances have hedge fund managers
been found to owe a duty to investors directly. United States v.
Lay, 612 F.3d 440, 445 (6th Cir. 2010); Retirement Program for
Employees of Fairfield v. Madoff, No. X05CV0950115618, 2010
WL 2106654 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 16, 2010).
9
See Paige Capital Mgmt., LLC v. Lerner Master Fund, LLC,
No. 5502-CS, 2011 WL 3505355, at *31 (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 2011)
(“As a matter of default law, Paige General Partner clearly owes
fiduciary duties to the limited partners in the Hedge Fund.”).
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10
See Glocap Search, Inc. & Hedge Fund Research, Inc., 2011
Glocap Hedge Fund Compensation Report.
11

Gregory Zuckerman, Juliet Chung & Michael Corkery,
“Hedge Funds Cut Back on Fees” (Wall St. J., Sept. 9, 2013),
available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127
887323893004579054952807556352.
12
Gokce Soydemir, Jan Smolarski & Sangheon Shin, “Hedge
Funds, Fund Attributes and Risk Adjusted Returns 7 (Unpublished manuscript, Sept. 15, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1896524.
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subject to high-water marks are properly calculated
with respect to each investor.
A second limit on managerial performance-based
competition is a hurdle rate, which prevents the manager from being paid unless a minimum rate of return
is achieved. Hurdle rates may be calculated annually or
on a cumulative basis and may be fixed at an absolute
rate or depend on some other rate or performance
benchmark. High-water marks are more common than
hurdle rates. Approximately 19 percent of hedge funds
use hurdle rates,13 and, when a hurdle is used, it is typically in conjunction with a high-water mark.14
In addition to performance fees, a manager’s own
investment in the fund may be a source of compensation. Managers often co-invest a significant portion of
their own capital directly in the underlying funds they
manage. It is estimated that between 59 percent and

anagers with higher co-investment may be
less likely to use a high-water mark, since
co-investment can be a substitute incentive
alignment device.

M

32 percent of managers have personal wealth in their
funds.15 Managers with higher co-investment may be
less likely to use a high-water mark, since co-investment
can be a substitute incentive alignment device.
Limited Investor Rights. Under limited partnership
law, the hedge fund manager (general partner) has the
exclusive right to manage the company,16 except with
respect to a few extraordinary issues.17 In addition, a
hedge fund’s limited partnership operating agreement
contractually defines the rights and duties between the
fund manager and the limited partner investors. The
agreement empowers the management company with
13
Sangheon Shin, Jan Smolarski & Gokce Soydemir, “For
Whom Hurdle Rate and High-Watermark Exist?” 30-31 (Unpublished manuscript, Sept. 30, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2154639.
14

Id.

15

George O. Aragon & Vikram Nanda, “On Tournament Behavior in Hedge Funds: High Water Marks, Fund Liquidation, and the
Backfilling Bias,” 25 Rev. Fin. Stud. 937, 946 (2012) (finding that,
among the hedge fund managers investigated, 32 percent had personal
wealth invested); Haitao Li, Xiaoyan Zhang & Rui Zhao, “Investing
in Talents: Manager Characteristics and Hedge Fund Performances,”
46 J. Fin. & Quantitative Analysis 59, 65 (Feb. 2011).
16
17

Unif. Ltd. P’ship Act § 406(a) (2001).

The extraordinary matters over which limited partners have
consent rights include amending the partnership agreement and sale
of at least substantially all of the partnership’s assets outside the
ordinary course of business. Unif. Ltd. P’ship Act § 406(b).

30

wide-ranging authority to manage all aspects of the hedge
fund’s business, including its investment portfolio.
The limited partners provide capital as the fund’s
equity investors. Although limited partnership statutes
permit a partnership agreement to grant voting rights
to limited partners,18 hedge fund limited partnerships
do not typically grant limited partners any voting
rights or the ability to nominate directors.19 The hedge
fund management company directly or indirectly
owns all of the fund’s voting shares in a separate class
with no economic rights.20 Accordingly, the limited
partners of a hedge fund are passive investors whose
decision-making is limited to deciding when and how
much capital to contribute or redeem.
Hedge funds also place significant short-term restrictions on investors’ ability to redeem their capital
and to resell or otherwise transfer their shares. A fund
operating agreement typically restricts investors’ ability to withdraw capital to a periodic basis, such as
monthly, quarterly, or semi-annually, and may permit
the manager to completely bar withdrawals at its discretion. In addition, investors must typically give 30
to 90 days’ notice before withdrawing capital. Hedge
funds may also implement an initial lockup period
that prohibits the withdrawal of a capital contribution
after it is first invested in the fund. Lockup periods
generally range from less than one quarter to one full
year.21 A 2012 industry study found the average hedge
fund redemption period to be 35 days and the average
lockup period to be 5.85 months.22 Hedge funds may
18
See, e.g., Unif. Ltd. P’ship Act § 17-302(b) (“[T]he partnership agreement may grant to all or certain identified limited partners or a specified class or group of limited the partners the right
to vote separately or with all or any call or group of the limited
partners or the general partners, on any matter.”).
19
Managed Funds Ass’n, Sound Practices for Hedge Fund
Managers 11 (2009). Partnership statutes expressly allow for a
partnership agreement to completely eliminate any voting powers
of limited partners. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 17-302(f) (“A
partnership agreement may provide that any limited partner or class
or group of limited partners shall have no voting rights.”).
20
See Alexander Ineichen, AIMA’s Roadmap to Hedge Funds,
8 (12th ed., Alt. Inv. Mgmt. Ass’n, 2012), available at http://
www.aima.org/download.cfm/docid/E9031A27-E978-400985EA1A8D325DAF7D; James D. Spellman, Hedge Funds: How
They Serve Investors in U.S. and Global Markets 10 (Coal. of
Private Inv. Cos., 2009), available at http://www.hedgefundfacts.
org/hedge/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/Hedge_Funds.pdf.
21
James R. Barth, Tong Li, Triphon Phumiwasana & Glenn
Yago, Hedge Funds: Risks and Returns in Global Capital Markets
38-41 (Milken Inst., 2006) (finding that a majority of hedge funds
have a lock-up period of less than one quarter). Hedge funds may
also use “soft” lockups that allow investors to redeem during their
lock-up period by paying the fund a penalty fee for doing so.
22
Ross Ford, Joe Childs & Graeme Terry, “Liquidity: Overview
of Hedge Fund Liquidity Structures” (Hedge Fund Spotlight, Dec.
2012, at 2, available at https://www.preqin.com/docs/newsletters/
hf/Preqin_HFSL_Dec_2012_Liquidity_Structures.pdf.
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also use a contractual provision known as a “gate” to
limit how much capital can be withdrawn on a given
date. Gates usually limit investor redemptions to
10 percent to 25 percent of the value of the fund, but
they may also (or in the alternative) limit redemptions
to a portion of the investor’s own capital. Hedge funds
may also segregate a portion of an investor’s capital
into an illiquid “side pocket” that prevents the investor from withdrawing its capital until the manager
actually exits the investment.
Hedge Fund Corporations. Two-thirds of hedge funds
globally are organized outside of the United States in
an “offshore” jurisdiction, such as the Cayman Islands,
and they are typically organized as corporations.
U.S.-managed hedge funds are organized in offshore
jurisdictions primarily to appeal to non-U.S.
investors seeking confidentiality, to permit U.S. taxexempt investors (e.g., pension funds and charitable
organizations) to take advantage of potentially
beneficial tax treatment from investing offshore, and
to afford greater flexibility via exclusion from U.S.
investment company regulation.
From a governance point of view, the most distinguishing aspect of offshore hedge funds is that, unlike
most of their U.S.-based peers, offshore hedge funds
typically have a board of directors. This is because
offshore funds are typically organized as corporations
(which must have boards as a matter of basic corporate law) or are located in jurisdictions, such as the
Cayman Islands, that require funds organized in the
jurisdiction to have boards.23 Offshore hedge funds
also sometimes list their shares on stock exchanges
that mandate independent directors as part of their
listing requirements.
The duties of hedge fund directors are similar to
those of public company directors. Hedge fund directors have a duty to act in the best interests of the fund
without any conflicts. They must also independently
“exercise reasonable care, skill, and diligence” in furthering the fund’s interests, which requires proactive
supervision and information gathering. This oversight
role includes monitoring the manager’s investment
performance and adherence to its investment policy,
the fund’s compliance with applicable laws and regulations, and disclosures to and treatment of the fund’s
23
See, e.g., BVI, Cayman and Jersey Hedge Funds 20 (Walkers Global, 2012), available at http://hb.betterregulation.com/
external/Global%29%20Hedge%20Funds%20%28Client%20
Guide%29.pdf (The Cayman Islands Monetary Authority “requires
a minimum of 2 individual directors for registered funds.”); Jonathan
Fitzgibbons, “Cayman Islands: Starting a Cayman Islands Hedge
Fund” (Mondaq, May 9, 2012), available at http://www.mondaq.
com/x/131154/Banking/So+You+Want+To+Start+A+Hedge+Fund.
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investors and overseeing third-party administrators
responsible for preparing financial statements and
determining the fund’s net asset value.24
In practice, the oversight role hedge fund directors
play does not seem to be rigorous—probably because
directors are appointed by managers (as opposed to
investors), often sit on the boards of numerous funds,
and/or lack the requisite financial expertise or independence from fund managers to provide independent and
disinterested oversight. Hedge fund directors are also
not subject to any form of market for corporate control. Hedge fund investors usually do not have voting
shares and hence lack the ability to replace directors.
Federal Law. In the United States, federal law indirectly
impacts how hedge funds are governed by providing
assurance to investors against fraud and by mandating
certain disclosures and business conduct standards.
The primary federal statutes that apply to hedge funds

wo-thirds of hedge funds globally are
organized outside of the United States in an
“offshore” jurisdiction, such as the Cayman
Islands, and they are typically organized as
corporations.

T

are the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (Advisers
Act),25 the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act),26 and
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange
Act).27 Although hedge funds’ investing and trading
activities are subject to the Investment Company Act
of 1940,28 hedge funds limit their investor base by
number and wealth-qualifications so as to be exempt
from its regulation.29 The Investment Company Act
24
Judgment of Aug. 26, 2011, Weavering Macro Fixed Income
Fund Ltd. (In Liquidation) v. Peterson, Grand Court, Cayman
Islands (Cause No. FSD 113 of 2010).
25

15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1-80b-21 (2012).

26

15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (2012).

27

15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78pp (2012).

28

15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1-80a-64 (2012).

29

Hedge funds operate so as to qualify for at least one of two
exclusions from the definition of an investment company. Under
the Investment Company Act, hedge funds are excluded from the
definition of investment company so long as they have no more than
100 investors and sell their securities only through a private sale.
15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1). Further, hedge funds are excluded from the
definition of investment company so long as they only sell securities
to “qualified purchasers” through a private sale. 15 U.S.C. § 80a3(c)(7). Qualified purchasers include both natural persons owning
at least $5 million in investments and certain companies with at
least $100 million in securities investments. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)
(51)(A)(i); 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a51-1(g)(2) (2005).
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subjects regulated funds to wide-ranging and detailed
regulation,30 including substantial limitations on a
fund’s use of leverage and ability to engage in short
sales and derivatives transactions.
All U.S.-based hedge fund managers must register
under the Advisers Act, unless they fall within an
exemption, such as advising funds with less than
$150 million in assets under management or qualifying as a foreign private adviser.31 Hedge funds also

egistered and unregistered hedge fund
managers are subject to the provisions of the
Advisers Act prohibiting material misstatements
to, misleading omissions to, and other fraudulent
practices against investors or prospective
investors. In addition, in raising capital from
limited partner investors, hedge funds are subject
to the antifraud provisions of the Securities Act
and the Exchange Act.

R

raise capital privately, so as not to be subject to the
Securities Act’s mandatory registration and disclosure
obligations required of companies making a public
offering of securities.32
Registered and unregistered hedge fund managers
are subject to the provisions of the Advisers Act prohibiting material misstatements to, misleading omissions
to, and other fraudulent practices against investors or
prospective investors.33 In addition, in raising capital
30
See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1(b)(1); SEC, Form N-1A Items 3, 5,
10, 14-15 (requiring disclosure of information including contact
information of the fund’s investment advisers and portfolio managers, the history of the fund, its risk/return profile and investment
objectives, the fund’s organization, and how the fees it charges to
investors are calculated). Registered investment companies must
also disclose portfolio holdings quarterly to the SEC and semiannually to investors. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-30(a)-(b), (e); 17 C.F.R. §§
270.30b1-1, b1-5, e-1. Open-end registered investment companies
must daily calculate net asset value and allow investors to redeem
shares within seven days at that value. 15 U.S.C § 80a-22(e); 17
C.F.R. § 270.22c-1(a) (requiring registered investment companies
to sell, redeem, or repurchase shares at net asset value); 17 C.F.R.
§ 270.22c-1(b) (requiring registered investment companies to
calculate net asset value at least daily).
31

15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-3(b), 80b-3(l), 80b-3(m).

32
To qualify for a private offering, hedge funds generally limit
their investor base almost exclusively to accredited investors, which
include institutions with at least $5 million in assets and natural
persons whose net worth (or whose joint net worth with a spouse)
exceeds $1 million or who have an annual income for the last two
years of at least $200,000 (or $300,000 in joint spousal income).
17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a).
33
17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-(8). Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles, 72 Fed. Reg. 44756,
44759 (Aug. 9, 2007).

32

from limited partner investors, hedge funds are subject
to the antifraud provisions of the Securities Act and the
Exchange Act.34 Under Securities Act Section 17(a), it is
unlawful for any issuer to make an untrue statement of
material fact or to omit any fact so that a statement that
was made is misleading.35 Under Exchange Act Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5, material omissions in connection
with the sale of any security are likewise prohibited.36
Rule 10b-5-1 prohibits hedge fund managers from
using material nonpublic information to purchase or
sell securities (insider trading).37 In addition, under
various provisions of the Exchange Act and Securities
Act, hedge funds are prohibited from manipulating the
prices of publicly or privately held securities.38
The Advisers Act requires registered hedge fund
managers to electronically file and keep current Form
ADV with the SEC.39 All parts of Form ADV, except
for an investment brochure, must also be made available to the public on the Investment Adviser Public
Disclosure website.40 The brochure must be written
in “plain English” and be provided to prospective
clients and annually to existing clients. Part 1 of Form
ADV requires managers to disclose basic information
relating to the firm and its business, so as to assist
regulators with oversight. Part 2 of Form ADV requires a manager to disclose information relating to
potential conflicts of interest and other issues, including fees and how they are calculated, client referrals,
disciplinary history, and the manager’s supervision of
personnel.41 For the purposes of assisting regulatory
authorities in preserving financial stability, registered
hedge fund advisers with at least $150 million in
assets under management must also disclose details
about their funds’ investment positions, counterparties, and other information on Form PF to the SEC,
which makes the form available to the Financial
Stability Oversight Council.42 Hedge funds must also
34
Notwithstanding the fact that hedge funds privately raise
capital in reliance upon Regulation D of the Securities Act, such
an offering is fully subject to the Act’s antifraud provisions.
35

Exchange Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j; Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 (2007).
37

65 Fed. Reg. 51716, 51737 (2000).

38

Larry D. Soderquist, Understanding the Securities Laws §
14:5 (4th ed. 2004).
39

17 C.F.R. §§ 275.203.1, 275.204-1.

40

The Investment Adviser Public Disclosure website is located
at http://www.adviserinfo.sec.gov.
41

See SEC, Form ADV pt. 2.

42

SEC, Form PF, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/
final/2011/ia-3308-formpf.pdf; Reporting by Investment Advisers to Private Funds and Certain Commodity Pool Operators and
Commodity Trading Advisors on Form PF, Investment Advisers Act
Release No. 3308, 76 Fed. Reg. 71,128 (Oct. 31, 2011).
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comply with other disclosure requirements under the
Exchange Act arising out of any large equity investments in public companies.43
The Advisers Act also requires hedge fund managers to keep specific business and accounting records,
to protect any client assets over which the fund has
legal custody, and ensure that their own personnel
comply with federal securities law and regulation.
Rule 206(4)-7 under the Advisers Act requires fund
managers to establish a compliance program that
includes written policies and procedures and a designated chief compliance officer.44 These requirements
have spurred a renewed focus on compliance and best
practices by market participants.

the fund’s past performance.45 Investors are also quick
to withdraw their capital from poorly performing
funds. 46 In addition to performance, hedge fund
investors care about governance. Institutional hedge
fund investors typically demand some threshold level of
quality with respect to governance and will withdraw
their funds, or refuse to invest in the first place, if the
fund lacks the desired quality.47 For example, in 2009
CalPERS stated that it would no longer invest in hedge
funds in which manager compensation was perceived
as misaligning incentive.48
Investor Demand for Quality Governance. Given that
investors base their investment decisions in part
upon the hedge funds’ perceived governance quality,

HEDGE FUND GOVERNANCE DEVICES
In response to market pressures, managers adopt
investor-friendly governance devices that reduce
agency costs and provide additional assurance over
and above applicable federal and state law. Hedge
fund governance devices fall into three categories:
those that are driven directly by equity investors, those
that arise from managers’ performance-based compensation, and those that are required by the funds’
short-term creditors.
Investor-Driven Governance. Despite being subject to
short-term restrictions on their withdrawal rights,
a primary governance mechanism over hedge fund
managers is the high propensity of investors to
withdraw or not commit their funds in response to
poor performance or governance. Unsurprisingly,
hedge fund investors decide to invest largely based on

43
First, hedge funds must disclose large shareholdings of public
companies. To regulate the market for control of public companies,
Exchange Act Sections 13(d) and 13(g) require that hedge funds or
their advisers disclose beneficial ownership of greater than 5 percent
in a class of voting shares of securities registered under the Act and
disclose whether the purpose of such ownership is to acquire or
influence the issuer. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d), (g); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d1(a). In connection with preventing insider trading, Section 16(a)
requires that hedge funds, upon acquiring a 10 percent ownership
stake in any issuer’s class of voting equity securities registered pursuant to the Exchange Act, must disclose such ownership, any other
equity ownership in the company, and any subsequent changes in
such ownership. 15 U.S.C. § 78(p)(3)(B); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.16a-1,
240.16a-2. In addition, under Section 13(f) hedge funds owning
more than $100 million in stock traded on a national exchange
are required to quarterly disclose to the public all of their equity
holdings. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13f-1(b); Disclosure of Short Sales and
Short Positions by Institutional Investment Managers, Exchange
Act Release No. 58,785, 73 Fed. Reg. 61,678 (Oct. 17, 2008).
44
Compliance Programs of Investment Companies and Investment Advisers, Advisers Act Release No. 2204, Investment Company
Act Release No. 26,299, 68 Fed. Reg. 74714 (Dec. 24, 2003).
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nstitutional hedge fund investors typically
demand some threshold level of quality with
respect to governance and will withdraw their
funds, or refuse to invest in the first place, if
the fund lacks the desired quality.

I

it is important to note the specific governance (and
operational) characteristics that investors consider to
be high quality. Investor surveys indicate a substantial
degree of uniformity and sophistication regarding the
types of governance and operational characteristics
they demand.49
Unsurprisingly, hedge fund investors have strong
preferences when it comes to risk. Investors demand
45
See, e.g., Vikas Agarwal, Naveen D. Daniel & Narayan Y.
Naik, “Flows, Performance, and Managerial Incentives in Hedge
Funds” 30 (EFA 2003 Annual Conference, Paper No. 501, July 22,
2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=424369 (finding that
“money-flows chase recent good performance”); Andrea Beltratti
& Claudio Morana, “Aggregate Hedge Funds’ Flows and Returns,”
18 App. Fin. Econ. 1755, 1755-57 (2008).
46
Guillermo Baquero & Marno Verbeek, “A Portrait of Hedge
Fund Investors: Flows, Performance and Smart Money,” 6-7
(Unpublished manuscript, Oct. 22, 2009), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=773384 (finding that hedge fund investors rapidly
withdraw capital from underperforming funds).
47
Ineichen, supra note 20 (“Governance has become a ‘make
or break’ area in the investment decision-making process.”).
48
Letter from Kurt Silberstein, Senior Portfolio Manager,
Global Equity, & Craig Dandurand, Portfolio Manager, Global
Equity, to CalPERS Hedge Fund Partners (Mar. 11, 2009) (on file
with author).
49
See, e.g., Corporate Governance in Hedge Funds: Investor Survey 2011 (Carne Global Fin. Servs., 2011), available at
http://www.carnegroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/CarneHedge-Fund-Governance-Survey.pdf; PriceWaterhouseCoopers,
Transparency Versus Returns: The Institutional Investor View of
Alternative Assets 50 (2008), available at www.qrmo.com/pdf/
PwC_alternatives_briefing.pdf.
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that portfolio-level risks be subject to pre-defined limits; that new positions be simulated before adoption;
and that operational, counterparty, and liquidity risks
be measured, identified, limited, and tested. Although
investors may demand lockups and other short-term
redemption restrictions to preserve fund stability, they
nonetheless prefer to be able to redeem most, if not
all, of their capital within one year.
Investors also have strong preferences regarding
transparency, seeking comprehensive, intelligible disclosures about risk, occurring anywhere from monthly
to in real-time. In practice, an estimated 89 percent
of hedge funds make at least monthly disclosures to
investors.50
Investors also seek an alignment between performance fee payment period and investment horizon

lthough investors may demand lockups and
other short-term redemption restrictions to
preserve fund stability, they nonetheless prefer to
be able to redeem most, if not all, of their capital
within one year.

A

and, accordingly, express a desire for performance
fees to be calculated on a multi-year basis to align
incentives for long-term investments and prevent
managers from being paid for investments that later
result in losses.
Investors further expect that trade processing will
be automated as much as possible, that internal controls relating to trading will be automated and documented, and that fund service providers will be fully
vetted and will interact frequently with management.
When it comes to valuation, investors expect managers to have external oversight and well-documented
practices and controls, especially with respect to
illiquid assets, in order to guard against fraud and
performance smoothing.
Surveys also indicate that, with respect to hedge
fund board oversight and powers, investors prefer
that boards have the power to replace managers, that
service providers report directly to boards, and that
boards (rather than managers) ultimately be responsible for valuation and decisions regarding suspending
fund redemptions. Investors also prefer that hedge
fund directors sit on no more than 30 boards, that
hedge fund boards have no fewer than three directors
(at least two of whom are independent), that the manager is represented on the board, and that directors
are full-time, professional directors.
50

34

PriceWaterhouseCoopers, supra note 49, at 50.

Investor demand for quality operational practices
can also be bolstered by the fact that investors may
be able to detect fraud and other operational risks ex
ante. There is an entire advisory industry dedicated
to providing hedge fund due diligence services, which
include making books and other materials available
to prospective and current investors to assist them
in assessing the operational quality of the funds.51 In
addition, a growing body of academic studies is available, which may also be able to help investors detect
which hedge funds are more likely to commit fraud
or suffer from other operational deficiencies.52
Short-Term Creditors and Counterparties. Hedge funds
often obtain some form of short-term credit financing,
or leverage, as part of their investment strategies.53
Leverage may come from margin collateral;54 cash
raised through short-term sales and repurchases
(repos) of financial instruments; 55 and options,
swaps, or other derivatives transactions.56 Leverage
is relevant to governance because it results in the
funds being continuously and closely monitored by
creditors and derivatives counterparties. Indeed, a
2008 Government Accountability Office investigation
of the oversight activities of prime brokers and other
hedge fund creditors and counterparties took note
of their stringent practices.57 When hedge funds take
51

See, e.g., Matthew Ridley, How to Invest in Hedge Funds:
An Investment Professional’s Guide (2004).
52
See, e.g., Stephen J. Brown, William Goetzmann, Bing Liang &
Christopher Schwarz, “Trust and Delegation,” 103(2) J. Fin. Econ. 221
(2012); Stephen J. Brown, William Goetzmann, Bing Liang & Christopher Schwarz, “Mandatory Disclosure and Operational Risk: Evidence
from Hedge Fund Registration,” 63(6) J. Fin. 2785 (2008).
53
For an overview of the sources of hedge fund financing, see
generally Evolution of the Hedge Fund Financing Model (Barclays
Capital Solutions Grp., Sept. 2012), available at http://www.
thehedgefundjournal.com/sites/default/files/evolution_of_financing_model.pdf.
54
Margin financing means to borrow against a particular
investment position or an entire portfolio. Frank Barbarino, “Leverage, Hedge Funds, and Risk,” 6 (NEPC, 2009), available at http://
www.nepc.com/writable/research_articles/file/09_07_nepc_leverage_hf_and_risk.pdf.
55
In a repo transaction, the amount of short-term cash a hedge
fund is able to raise depends upon the haircut being applied to the
asset used as collateral. A hedge fund will not be able to raise as much
short-term cash through repos when the perception of risk increases
because it causes the haircut to the repo’s collateral to increase and
the repo lenders’ willingness to fund the trade to decrease.
56
Hedge funds may also obtain leverage by borrowing securities
(to short sell) or through synthetic leverage structures.
57
Orice M. Williams, Director Financial Markets and Community
Investment, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Capital Markets,
Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises, House of Representatives, Hedge Funds: Overview of Regulatory Oversight, Counterparty Risks, and Investment Challenges 30-32 (GAO-09-667T,
2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09677t.pdf.
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excessive risks, it is often their creditors (not their
equity investors) that force them to close and liquidate
their assets.
In margin financing, hedge fund investment positions are evaluated and marked-to-market on a daily
basis by prime brokers; a fund must add additional
margin to the extent that the investments’ market
value falls below a minimum threshold level (maintenance margin). Prime brokers have full transparency
over the investment positions of hedge funds using
their services and are quick to terminate their relationships with funds failing to comply with their risk
management protocols. Prime brokers’ relationships
with hedge funds are also monitored by their own
banking or securities regulators.
Hedge fund repo counterparties are also generally
prudent about their short-term exposures to the funds
and consider hedge funds among the riskiest type of
counterparties, such that the funds receive a larger haircut than other counterparties. Hedge fund derivatives
counterparties typically require the funds’ trades to be
supported by substantial amounts of collateral.
Discipline by creditors and counterparties may be
inadequate to protect hedge fund investors, however.
For example, hedge funds often use multiple prime
brokers to finance their positions, which prevents any
single broker from knowing a fund’s total leverage. In
addition, competition for hedge fund clients may lead
prime brokers to ease credit terms or fund oversight.

Fraud and Misreporting. The most basic type of
hedge fund agency cost is manager fraud through
misreporting some aspect of the fund’s returns, asset
values, risk taking, or investment activities. Hedge fund
investors may potentially be subject to higher agency
costs from misreporting than are investors in regulated
investment funds because hedge funds are not required
to value their assets according to SEC guidelines.58
Studies have found data consistent with a wide
variety hedge fund misreporting, including reporting
higher returns in December by underreporting returns
earlier in the year,59 increasing the value of their stock
holdings through end-of-month market purchases,60
and revising or delaying poor past performance.61
Studies also suggest that some hedge funds may
deliberately understate the volatility of their returns. A
relatively common type of misreporting by managers

W

hen hedge funds take excessive risks, it
is often their creditors (not their equity
investors) that force them to close and
liquidate their assets.
is reporting small positive returns, as opposed to small
losses.62 The hedge funds most likely to misreport
returns are those holding illiquid assets or assets
that otherwise give managers discretion in valuation.
Nonetheless, while misreporting may be significant
when it takes place, it is not widespread.63

HEDGE FUND AGENCY COSTS
Hedge fund managers are the agents of their investors. Despite the investor-friendly governance devices
that hedge funds adopt, the wide-ranging powers that
the hedge fund legal regime bestows upon hedge fund
managers potentially allows them to impose significant agency costs on investors in the form of losses
and inefficiencies. Hedge fund agency costs arise from
five primary sources:
1. Fraud or misreporting with respect to a fund’s
performance and other characteristics;
2. Incentive misalignments due to how hedge fund
managers are compensated;
3. Overly long redemption restrictions;
4. Managers appropriating fund profits; and
5. Managers favoring certain investors or service
providers.
Empirical studies (cited in the following paragraphs)
suggest that the most significant source of agency costs
is the subtle manipulation of performance returns
(valuation) by managers when it suits their interests.
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58
SEC Valuation and Liquidity Guidance for Registered Investment Companies, 87-102 (Inv. Co. Inst., 2011), available at http://
www.ici.org/pdf/pub_11_valuation_volume1.pdf.
59
Vikas Agarwal, Naveen D. Daniel & Narayan Y. Naik, “Do
Hedge Funds Manage Their Reported Returns?,” 24(10) Rev. Fin.
Stud. 3281, 3283 (2011).
60
Itzhak Ben-David, Francesco Franzoni, Augustin Landier &
Rabih Moussawi, “Do Hedge Funds Manipulate Stock Prices?,”
68(6) J. Fin. 2383, 2432 (2013) (finding “data to test the conjecture
that hedge funds manipulate stock prices at the the end of the month
by buying some of their stock holdings before market close”).
61
Andrew J. Patton, Tarun Ramadorai & Michael Streatfield,
“Change You Can Believe In? Hedge Fund Data Revisions,” J. Fin.
(forthcoming 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1934543;
George O. Aragon & Vikram Nanda, “Strategic Delays and
Clustering in Hedge Fund Reported Returns,” 3 (Unpublished
manuscript, Sept. 3, 2013), available at http://www.public.asu.
edu/~goaragon/Papers/HFDelay.pdf.
62
See generally Nicolas P. B. Bollen & Veronika K. Pool, “Do
Hedge Fund Managers Misreport Returns? Evidence From the
Pooled Distribution,” 64 J. Fin. 2257 (2009).
63
From Manhattan to Madoff: The Causes and Lessons of
Hedge Fund Operational Failure 6 (Castle Hall Alts., 2009), available at http://www.cfainstitute.org/learning/products/publications/
contributed/Pages/from_manhattan_to_madoff__the_causes_and_
lessons_of_hedge_fund_operational_failure.aspx.
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Fee-Based Incentive Misalignments. Agency costs
also arise from the structure of hedge fund managers’
annual compensation. Because managers earn
performance fees on an annual basis for investment
positions or strategies that may be longer-term in
nature, a manager may be able to earn performance
fees in the early years of a strategy and then pass losses
along to investors when the investment ultimately
suffers losses. Hedge fund managers may also have
incentives to take on greater risk after obtaining
investor capital because of the asymmetric payoff
structure of their performance-based compensation
arrangement: the manager shares in the profits of a
fund with investors but not in fund losses.
In addition, management fees may impose agency
costs on investors because, at least in the short term,
a fixed management fee is not dependent on performance. For very large hedge funds, management fee
compensation earned pursuant to management fees
far exceeds the amount necessary to pay for operating overhead and, thereby, reduces the incentives for
managers to earn profits for investors.

edge fund managers may also have incentives
to take on greater risk after obtaining investor
capital because of the asymmetric payoff structure
of their performance-based compensation
arrangement: the manager shares in the profits of
a fund with investors but not in fund losses.

H

funds increased or decreased some aspect of their fees
over a three-year period.64
Favoritism Toward Certain Investors or Service
Providers. Hedge fund investors may suffer from
agency costs because managers give favorable
treatment to some investors over others or to service
providers at the expense of investors generally. Through
separate agreements known as “side letters,” certain
hedge fund investors may obtain favorable terms for
themselves that are not offered to all investors in the
fund’s general offering documents.65 Side letters may
give selected investors favorable treatment regarding
fees, disclosure, liquidity, and other terms.66 Favorable
liquidity or disclosure terms may allow some investors
to exit the fund ahead of other investors and, thereby,
create a conflict of interest between the manager and
the investors that do not have the favorable terms.
Investors may also suffer from agency costs due to
managers giving favorable treatment to service providers at their expense or appointing service provider representatives to the fund’s board of directors. For example,
hedge funds may pay for prime broker services with
“soft dollar” payments—by directing trades to their
prime broker or affiliated third parties, or paying abovemarket rates for brokerage commissions.67 Undisclosed
soft dollar payments to prime brokers may constitute
a conflict of interest subject to an enforcement action
by the SEC or other regulatory authorities.68

IMPROVING HEDGE FUND GOVERNANCE
Restrictions on Investor Redemptions. The use
of lockups, notice periods, or gates temporarily
reduces investors’ ability to withdraw their capital
and may permit the manager to use investor funds
opportunistically for its own benefit, thereby
imposing an agency cost on investors. Redemption
restrictions also impose agency costs to the extent
that the inability to withdraw capital imposes a
foregone (opportunity) cost from not being able to
use the capital elsewhere.
Overcompensation of Managers. Another potential
hedge fund agency cost is that investors may pay more
in fees than is necessary to produce a given level of
returns, thereby allowing fund managers to capture a
portion of the fund’s profits at the investors’ expense.
One way for managers to appropriate fund profits
is to increase fees after good performance. Although
most hedge funds do not change their fees with respect
to any particular investor, a study of 3,814 funds from
April 2008 until June 2011 found that 7.8 percent of
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From the level and structure of fees to the amount
and timing of disclosures, hedge fund governance can
64
Vikas Agarwal & Sugata Ray, “Determinants and Implications of Fee Changes in the Hedge Fund Industry,” 4-5 (Unpublished manuscript , Mar. 15, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2024362.
65

Mark Perlow, “Managing Hedge Fund Conflicts of Interest,”
40(7) Rev. Sec. & Commodities Reg. 75 (Apr. 2007), available
at http://www.klgates.com/files/tempFiles/a3ff2ce8-8ff0-4971a8e9-34a575d155ce/Perlow_Review_of_Securities_Commodities_Regulation.pdf.
66
Id. A “most favored nation” side letter clause promises that an
investor will be offered any superior terms offered to other investors.
67
Gregory Curtis, White Paper No. 4—Soft Dollars: Greycourt’s
Position, 1 (Sept. 2001), available at http://www.greycourt.com/wpcontent/uploads/file/White_Paper004-Soft_dollars-GDC.pdf.
68
See Mass. Fin. Servs. Co., Investment Company Act Release
No. 26,409, Advisors Act Release No. 2224, 82 SEC Docket 2036
(Mar. 31, 2004); Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., “SMH Capital
Fined $450,000 for Procedural Failures Regarding Soft Dollar
Payments, Distributing Improper Hedge Fund Sales Materials”
(Press Release, Jan. 9, 2008), available at http://www.finra.org/
Newsroom/NewsReleases/2008/P037758.
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be improved. This section offers suggestions for such
improvement, based on academic and industry studies of how different governance structures impact the
performance of hedge funds. Beyond a baseline set of
general governance devices, there is likely no group of
specific governance mechanisms that will optimize investor returns for investors in all hedge funds. This is
because whether a particular governance mechanism
will cause better performance depends on the characteristics of the firm. Hedge funds pursue a wide variety of investment strategies and hence have a wide
range of characteristics.
Fees. Performance fees may benefit investors to the
extent that they incentivize managers to improve their
performance and attract more talented managers to the
industry. However, performance fees are also a cost to
investors, in that they are deducted from increases in
the value of their assets. Empirical evidence supports
the theory that performance-based compensation
improves investors’ net-of-fee returns. Hedge fund
performance fees, in part, account for the funds’
outperformance of mutual funds (which by law cannot
charge asymmetric performance fees)69—and private
investment funds that do not charge performance
fees underperform those that do.70 In addition, most
studies examining the issue find that hedge funds that
charge higher performance fees have better returns.71
Higher fees may induce managers to take undertake
greater (and more skilled) effort and will make a fund
more attractive to higher-skilled managers. Thus,
a combination of high performance fees and low
management fees may be optimal for investors.
69
See generally Carl Ackermann, Richard McEnally & David
Ravenscraft, “The Performance of Hedge Funds: Risk, Return, and
Incentives,” 54(3) J. Fin. 833 (June 1999) (finding that in a sample
of funds from 1988–1995, hedge funds consistently outperformed
mutual funds in part because of incentive fees); Bing Liang, “On
the Performance of Hedge Funds,” 55(4) Fin. Analysts J. 72 (JulyAug. 1999) (finding that hedge funds exhibit superior risk-adjusted
returns as compared to mutual funds).
70

Cecile Le Moigne & Patrick Savaria, “Relative Importance
of Hedge Fund Characteristics,” 20 Fin. Mkts. Portfolio Mgmt.
419, 424 (2006). But see Roy Kouwenberg & William T. Ziemba,
“Incentives and Risk-Taking in Hedge Funds,” 31 J. Banking Fin.
3291, 3308 (2007) (finding that “hedge funds with incentive fees
have significantly lower mean returns (net of fees) and worse riskadjusted performance”).
71

See, e.g., Hung-Gay Fung, Xiaoqing Eleanor Xu & Jot Yau,
“Global Hedge Funds: Risk, Return, and Market Timing,” 58(6)
Fin. Analysts J. 19 (Nov.-Dec. 2002) (finding average hedge fund
returns positively related to performance fees for a sample of 115
equity funds from 1994 to 2000); William Fung & David A. Hsieh,
“Hedge-Fund Benchmarks: Information Content and Biases,” 58
Fin. Analysts J. 22 (Jan.-Feb. 2002).
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Another fee-related issue is the timing of performance-based compensation. In particular, moving
toward a multi-year compensation structure for managers may be a significant area for improvement. Currently, fewer than an estimated 10 percent of hedge
funds measure manager performance over multi-year
periods.72 However, nearly a quarter of hedge funds
pursue investment strategies that likely extend past an
annual period73 and, hence, should most likely adopt
a multi-year performance fee measure. There are two

combination of high performance fees and
low management fees may be optimal for
investors.

A

basic ways to compensate managers on a basis longer
than a year:
1. Implement a rolling and deferred performance fee
arrangement that calculates performance fees over
a multi-year period to match the actual realized
gains from an investment strategy; or
2. Place a portion of the annual performance fees in
an escrow account allowing investors to retrieve
the fees if the fund experiences losses in subsequent years.
High-Water Marks. Empirical studies generally find
that funds with high-water marks perform better than
those without.74 High-water marks (1) have generally
been found to reduce managers’ incentive to increase
risk after performing poorly, due to their aversion to
falling even further below the mark,75 and also (2)
create incentives for managers to close or continue to
operate poorly performing funds based on what is in
the investors’ best interest.
However, there is also evidence of that problems
can be caused by high-water marks. Compensating a
72
See 2011 New Hedge Fund Study (Seward & Kissel LLP
Memorandum, Feb. 21, 2012), available at http://fundtaxservices.
com/PDFs/2011NewHedgeFundStudy.pdf.
73
See Ineichen, supra note 20, at 19 (noting that 24.6 percent
of hedge funds pursue “event driven” strategies including investing around mergers and acquisitions and in illiquid distressed debt
instruments).
74
See, e.g., Indraneel Chakraborty & Sugata Ray, “Effort, Risk
and Walkaway Under High Water Mark Style Contracts,” 2, 20
(Unpublished manuscript, Mar. 14, 2010), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=1083089.
75
George O. Aragon & Vikram Nanda, “On Tournament
Behavior in Hedge Funds: High Water Marks, Fund Liquidation,
and the Backfilling Bias,” 25 Rev. Fin. Stud. 937 (2012).
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manager with an annual performance fee subject to a
high-water mark might cause an incentive misalignment between investors and managers when a fund’s
performance drops significantly below the mark. In
these situations, earning a performance fee requires a
substantial gain by year end, thereby giving the manager an incentive to substantially increase risk. The reason
for this is that coming in at, just below, or far below
the high-water mark will all result in the manager not
being paid any performance fee.76 There is evidence of
this “swing for the fences” effect.77 One study found
that as hedge funds fall below their high-water mark

igh-water marks may also reduce returns by
giving managers an incentive to lock-in profits
by reducing their risk-taking after surpassing a
high-water mark.

H

they increase risk, have lower expected risk-adjusted
returns, and are more likely to close due to inability
to ever recover losses to get “above water” (and hence
allow managers to be paid performance fees).78 For
this reason, industry commentators have called for
abolishing high-water marks altogether. High-water
marks may also reduce returns by giving managers an
incentive to lock-in profits by reducing their risk-taking
after surpassing a high-water mark.
Hedge fund investors should accordingly consider
investing in funds that (1) have attractive characteristics but do not use high-water marks or (2) remove
or reset their high-water marks if the fund drops
substantially below the mark. The latter will remove
the incentive for managers to take on undue risks in
an attempt to reach the high-water mark, and will
make it less likely that employees will leave a fund
that is substantially under water.
Hurdle Rates. Hurdle rates are most likely to benefit
investors in hedge funds whose returns are highly
correlated to stock, bond, or other broad markets.
Accordingly, investors should probably demand hurdle
rates only in funds that run the risk of providing
76
New Research Illustrates Wide-ranging Implications of the
Ubiquitous “High Water Mark” (AllAboutAlpha.com, Jan. 21.
2008), available at http://allaboutalpha.com/blog/2008/01/21/newresearch-illustrates-wide-ranging-implications-of-the-ubiquitoushigh-water-mark/.
77

See Chakraborty & Ray, supra note 74; Sugata Ray,” The
Downside of High Water Marks: An Empirical Study” (Unpublished manuscript Mar. 22, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1476372.
78

38

See generally Ray, supra note 77.

the same risk-adjusted returns as a cheaper, passive
investment vehicle (such as a stock index). Investors
should also consider having the hurdle rate be based
upon a specified level of correlation, instead of an
absolute level of return.79 That way, they will not have
to pay fees for returns that they sought to avoid by
investing in hedge funds in the first place (i.e., returns
correlated with broader markets).
Managerial Co-Investment. Managerial co-investment
unsurprisingly seems to align incentives and increase
performance. One study of a representative sample of
7,535 hedge funds from 1995 to 2004 found a positive
and statistically significant relationship between
co-investment and performance. 80 Co-investment
may also increase the incentives for managers to close
poorly performing funds when doing so is best for
investors. However, there may be a governance tradeoff with co-investment. Co-investment beyond a certain
level may decrease performance to the extent that
high co-investment could result in the fund manager
becoming too conservative. Although the optimal
range of co-investment is an issue yet to be analyzed
in depth, investors should require managers to make
at least some significant amount of co-investment,
including the reinvestment of profits into the fund to
help assure long-term incentive alignment.
Transparency. Investors are best off when they receive
all of the information they need on a timely basis to
make informed investment decisions—but nothing
more. Transparency in the hedge fund context refers
to the extent and frequency of disclosures about a
fund’s or manager’s performance, operations, and
structure. Prior to the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, which
effectively mandated that all hedge fund managers
publicly disclose information on Form ADV, a typical
established fund disclosed a significant amount of
information about its investments, performance,
and other characteristics. However, the level of
transparency differed significantly among hedge funds,
ranging from funds that provided only summary
statistics of returns to those providing full, positionlevel transparency.81 Since the 2008 financial crisis,
79
Houman B. Shadab, “Correlation: The New Hedge Fund
Hurdle” (Lawbitrage, Nov. 23, 2011, 6:02 PM), available at http://
lawbitrage.typepad.com/blog/2011/11/correlation-the-new-hedgefund-hurdle.html.
80
Vikas Agarwal, Naveen D. Daniel & Naraya Naik, “Role of
Managerial Incentives and Discretion in Hedge Fund Performance,”
64 J. Fin. 2221 (2009).
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Frank J. Travers, Investment Manager Analysis: A Comprehensive Guide to Portfolio Selection, Monitoring and Optimization
371 (Kindle ed., 2011).
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investors have demanded more transparency and hedge
funds have responded by increasing their disclosures
and reporting. Nonetheless, investor surveys indicate
that transparency remains a top concern.82
Investors can generally make more informed investment decisions when they get more frequent and
expansive hedge fund disclosures. More disclosure
will also likely lower a hedge fund’s cost of capital
and increase the liquidity of its shares in secondary
markets by giving investors more information about
the fund and the manager’s activities.
However, greater transparency does not always
make investors better off. Investors may suffer from
information overload and be unable to process vast
amounts of information effectively. Even sophisticated
investors may have difficulty distinguishing between
the unique aspects of different hedge fund disclosures.83 For hedge funds that hold illiquid securities
or complex instruments, transparency into the fund’s
investment positions is unlikely to give investors
significant insight into the fund’s investment strategy
given the numerous potential ways the manager may
be seeking to profit from the relationship between the
positions.84 The fact that investors typically do not
seek full position-level disclosures from managers
or require managers to report performance in a way
that mitigates performance-smoothing suggests that,
beyond a certain point, additional transparency is not
necessarily beneficial.85
A related issue is what information about the fund
is most important to investors when making investment decisions. Sophisticated hedge fund investors
already have well-defi ned preferences regarding
82
See, e.g., Corporate Governance in Hedge Funds: Investor
Survey 2011, supra note 49; A Guide to Institutional Investors’
Views and Preferences Regarding Hedge Fund Operational Infrastructures (Alternative Investment Mgt. Ass’n, 2011), available
at http://www.aima.org/en/document-summary/index.cfm/docid/
CF822EF3-CB7A-4B13-81A7949E4C97C0AA.
83
See Patrick Hayes, “Defining Hedge Fund Transparency—
The Challenge of Balancing Risk Management and Alpha Generation” (State Street, Sept. 21, 2011), available at http://www.
statestreet.com/wps/portal/internet/corporate/home/aboutstatestreet/newsmedia/newsarticles/newsarticledetail/!ut/p/c4/fY5
Na8JAFEV_zayymJcPk2l3KWiptWoVQbMZXmZeksFkIpmp2n_
fSF2UUspd3AsHLocXfIzFs6nRm95iy_e8SOVytwHxFOYg1s
8AL68CZpP3WQxvIT_wIvvBVysx8mi6Dee7CCDlc17UbV-O
Twd-aLw_PTJgsCDUNLglXRwDXtxa5oM3qiUn1-gbvmdwUV
1rStkdvTTW02DJS9WPy3oGqu-63jKg641gG9jxI3DIwLn6eyRa
0yQESET6UGU6EokGUiGmIsGsqsL_jKZXUh_enEnewV9WrsG
B9G-noB-0sTh8BncQOOOJQWn6esBTY-iuJ1SsYgFJhqUWJSB
UMYoKVEKh0lnEt8bz03HTnhdV_gUvZzxe/.
84
See Richard Bookstaber, “Hedge Fund Existential,” 59(5)
Fin. Analysts J. 19, 19-23 (Sept.-Oct. 2003).
85
See Felix Golitz & David Schroder, “Hedge Fund Transparency: Where Do We Stand?,” 12(4) J. Alt. Investments 20, 20-35
(Spring 2010).
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what information and level of transparency they
seek. In addition, there is a great deal of practitioner
literature on hedge fund disclosures, which typically
differentiates between what information investors
should look for prior to making an investment (due
diligence) versus what should be the subject of their
ongoing monitoring after they have invested with a
fund. Studies by financial economists also suggest
that investors should focus on a particular fund’s risk,
including operational risk.86 In particular, investors
should focus on disclosures about the uniqueness of
the fund’s investment strategy and its lack of correlation with broad market risk factors.87
The foregoing analysis of transparency suggests
that hedge fund investors should not seek real-time,
position-level disclosure across the board or for every

or hedge funds that hold illiquid securities
or complex instruments, transparency into
the fund’s investment positions is unlikely to
give investors significant insight into the fund’s
investment strategy given the numerous potential
ways the manager may be seeking to profit from
the relationship between the positions.

F

type of fund. Rather, they should focus on disclosures
that provide the right level and frequency of meaningful information about the manager’s strategy, investment risks, and operational controls.
Hedge Fund Directors. In the corporate context, strong
boards are essential due to shareholder capital lockin. Because equity investors in corporations make a
permanent contribution of capital to the firm, a board
is needed to oversee management to ensure that the
capital is used productively. In the hedge fund context,
by contrast, investor capital is not locked-in and can be
redeemed at any time, subject to relatively short-term
and limited redemption restrictions. As a result, hedge
fund investors may not need an intermediary board
to protect their interests; they can protect themselves
by simply cashing out of the fund. This likely explains
why 85 percent of the hedge funds based in North
86
See generally Keith H. Black, “Preventing and Detecting
Hedge Fund Failure Risk Through Partial Transparency,” 12
Derivatives Use, Trading & Reg. 330 (2007); Stephen J. Brown,
“Quantitative Measures of Operational Risk: An Application to
Funds Management,” 52(4) Acct. & Fin. 1001 (Dec. 2012).
87
See generally Sheridan Titman & Cristian Tiu, “Do the Best
Hedge Funds Hedge?,” 24 Rev. Fin. Stud. 123 (2010); Zheng Sun,
Ashley Wang & Lu Zheng, “The Road Less Traveled: Strategy
Distinctiveness and Hedge Fund Performance,” 25(1) Rev. Fin.
Stud. 96 (Jan. 2012).
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America do not have boards—and why there is no
evidence that funds with boards perform better than
those without them.
Likewise, investors in hedge funds with boards
should hesitate before pressuring managers to adopt
governance characteristics that appear to serve their
interests. Empirical studies of corporate governance
do not find that “good governance,” including director independence, increases performance.88 Hedge
funds may be particularly ill-served by independent
directors because the funds’ investment strategy and
risks are relatively difficult for outsiders, such as
independent directors, to understand. Compensating
hedge fund directors with equity interests in the fund
as a way to align incentives should be considered; such
compensation is associated with better performance
in public companies.89 Compensating directors with
structured notes tied to the performance of the director’s fund may be another way to align the director’s
incentives.90
Investors should be mindful that their efforts
to reform hedge fund boards might also be problematic given that governing financial institutions

edge funds may be particularly ill-served by
independent directors because the funds’
investment strategy and risks are relatively
difficult for outsiders, such as independent
directors, to understand.

H

seems particularly problematic. Given the inherent complexity of the financial world, reliance on
boards to monitor managers in banks has proven
to be an ineffective model of governance. A hedge
fund board may do little more than create a false
sense of security among investors, while imposing
significant costs.
Instead of relying on a board, investors should
require funds to establish committees relevant to their
areas of concern and rely on independent third-party
service providers for monitoring. Internal committees
can discipline a fund to commit to pre-established
88
See Paul Rose, “The Corporate Governance Industry,” 32 J.
Corp. L. 887, 910-11 (2007).
89

See Sanjai Bhagat, Brian Bolton & Roberta Romano, “The
Effect of Corporate Governance on Performance,” in H. Kent Baker
& Ronald Anderson, eds., Corporate Governance: A Synthesis of
Theory, Research, and Practice 97, 118-19 (2010).
90
For an overview of structured hedge fund products, see
generally Pirmin Stutzer, Structured Hedge Fund Products (2006),
available at http://db.riskwaters.com/global/events/FLAGSHIPS/
sppb2006/presentations/masterclass_pirmin_stutzer.pdf.
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policies and procedures and are more focused on
specific issues, as opposed to a wide variety of governance tasks. Third-party service providers have
their own reputational incentives to provide a check
on managers and are likely to be in a better position
to effectively do so.
For example, when it comes to the important issue
of valuing fund assets, a valuation committee can
establish applicable valuation policies and procedures
and address conflicts of interests in doing so. Then,
third-party administrators should be hired to conduct
their own independent valuation of fund assets, to
the extent possible. So long as practices ensure that
administrators are independent from managers, administrators can provide investors with valuations
that are free from conflicts of interests, a signal that
managers are committed to accurate reporting, and
a valuable “second opinion” when reliance on the
manager to value illiquid assets is necessary. Relying
on service providers has become more commercially
feasible due to innovations that have reduced their
cost and increased their ability to integrate into a
fund’s operations.
Redemption Restrictions. Although redemption
restrictions may impose agency costs on investors
to the extent they do not help a fund’s performance,
they may also allow investors to access funds with
higher returns. In general, relatively long-term, illiquid
investment strategies are a source of higher returns
because such strategies are offered at a discount to
compensate investors for giving up the ability to
quickly exit the investment.91 Long-term investment
strategies may also allow investors to access unique
sources of value not present in more widely available,
short-term investment strategies. As a result, investors
in hedge funds with illiquid strategies are compensated
for illiquidity risk with higher returns. Illiquid hedge
fund investment strategies may be undermined by
frequent investor redemptions, however, because
illiquid investments require more time to realize gains
than do liquid investments. Indeed, empirical studies
confirm that investors generally benefit when hedge
funds use redemption restrictions that allow managers
to realize gains from illiquid investments.92 Lockups
91
This discount is reflected in the well-documented “illiquidity
premium” in financial markets. Amir E. Khandani & Andrew W.
Lo, “Illiquidity Premia in Asset Returns: An Empirical Analysis
of Hedge Funds, Mutual Funds, and U.S. Equity Portfolios,” 3-6
(Unpublished manuscript , June 25, 2009, available at http://ssnr.
com/absract=14254954.
92
George A. Aragon, “Share Restrictions and Asset Pricing:
Evidence From the Hedge Fund Industry,” 83(1) J. Fin. Econ. 33,
34 (Jan. 2007).
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may also have the benefit of preventing a fund from
collapsing due to temporary poor returns, as they give
managers enough time to recover losses.
Accordingly, managers should adopt redemption
restrictions when doing so is consistent with the goals
of a long-term investment strategy. Liquidity may not
be as valuable as the premium investors receive for
accepting restrictions on withdrawals. In addition, the
development of increasingly liquid secondary markets
for hedge fund shares should decrease the importance
of short-term liquidity because a secondary market
provides investors with an additional means of exit.
Managed Accounts. A hedge fund structure that may
reflect an optimal governance arrangement for some
investors is a managed account. With a managed
account, an investor retains full ownership of its
funds and hires the fund manager to invest the funds
as a third party.93 In a managed account, it is the
responsibility of the investor to hire independent thirdparty service providers and undertake the account’s
operations (such as risk management and reporting).94
Managed accounts have become increasingly popular
with investors since the 2008 financial crisis.95
Benefits. The benefits of managed accounts relative
to traditional hedge fund structures are that managed
accounts give investors:
• Greater transparency (providing as much as realtime, position-level transparency);
• At least some degree of direct control over how the
assets are managed;
• A high degree of liquidity; and
• Greater control over how fees and taxes are
allocated.96
Disadvantages. Managed accounts do have several
disadvantages. One disadvantage is higher administrative costs, which necessarily arise from establishing and
operating numerous distinct accounts. These accounts

also limit access to certain investment strategies, such as
those that invest in hard-to-value illiquid assets, making it difficult to allocate the positions across different
accounts. Managed accounts may also suffer from an
agency cost in the form of adverse selection. Because
managed accounts are a structure with governance devices very much in the investor’s favor, the most soughtafter or skilled managers are generally not willing to
accede to their terms.97 Accordingly, investors may fail
to assess the quality of managed account providers. Investors in managed accounts also have a higher monitoring burden to ensure that the manager does not stray
from its strategy, does not favor the funds it manages
over its managed accounts, and adequately shadows any
underlying fund it is meant to track. Finally, managed
accounts also lack co-investment by managers, which

nvestors generally benefit when hedge funds
use redemption restrictions that allow
managers to realize gains from illiquid
investments. Lockups may also have the
benefit of preventing a fund from collapsing
due to temporary poor returns, as they give
managers enough time to recover losses.

I

is an important governance device and underlies hedge
fund managers’ high pay-performance sensitivity.
The disadvantages of managed accounts reflect the
inherent limitations investors face when they attempt
to obtain investor-friendly governance. Indeed, the
limitations on managed accounts are precisely the
reason why hedge fund investors may be better off
with fewer disclosures, higher fees, and less access to
their capital. Agreeing to those terms has its own set of
disadvantages, but it has the benefit of allowing investors to access a wider variety of hedge fund strategies
and, more likely, higher skilled managers.

CONCLUSION
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Although lower fees, greater liquidity, and more disclosures may generally improve governance and returns, investors should take a measured approach in
negotiating for such outcomes. Indeed, investors may
benefit from less disclosure, higher fees, and less access to their capital.
With respect to fees, investors should seek relatively low management fees in particularly large funds
to prevent paying substantial non-performance-based
fees to managers that go above their operating costs.
97
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Lower performance fees, on the other hand, may reduce the incentives of managers to perform well and
reduce the ability of a fund to attract skilled managers. Greater use of performance fees calculated over a
multi-year period is likely an area where governance
can be substantially improved.
Investors also should not always attempt to negotiate
greater redemption rights. Instead, they should focus
on ensuring that performance fees and liquidity terms
match the time horizon of the manager’s investment
strategy, so managers are paid when actual investment gains are realized and investors do not withdraw
their capital until the strategy has been implemented.
Redemption rights will also matter less as secondary
markets for hedge fund shares develop. Investors should
also question the use of high-water marks and hurdle
rates in certain contexts and attempt to have a manager
invest a substantial portion of its own wealth, and a
portion of fund profits, in the funds it manages.

42

In terms of transparency, real-time, position-level
transparency may do little to produce more valuable
information for investors. in fact, such a high level
of transparency may unduly burden managers and
reduce their competitive advantage. More important
than real-time, position-level transparency is transparency about the strength of a hedge fund’s operational
controls and the correlation of the fund’s returns with
stock and credit markets.
Investors also should not pressure hedge funds to
adopt boards or increase their reliance on, or expectations of, existing fund directors. They should instead
pressure managers to establish proper internal committees and rely more on administrators and other
third-party service providers to serve as an independent check, especially in the area of performance
reporting and valuation. To the extent boards are
relied on, equity-based compensation for directors
may make them more effective.

J O U R N A L O F TA X AT I O N A N D R E G U L AT I O N O F F I N A N C I A L I N S T I T U T I O N S

TFI-2801.indb 42

September/October 2014 Vol 28 / No 1

10/13/2014 13:48:33

